Douglas Knudsen v. Samuel W. Smith : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Douglas Knudsen v. Samuel W. Smith : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General, Earl F. Dorius; Assistant Atorney General- Attorneys for
Respondent.
Larry R. Keller; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Douglas Knudsen v. Samuel W. Smith, No. 13666.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/853
DEMENT U T A H S U P R £ M E COURT _ _ 
45.9 y WEE DECEIVED 
SKET m/3vrP> N. LIBRARY 
f 
. j C 9 1975 
STATE OF 
msim YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law School 
; DOUGLAS KNUDSEN, 
| Plaintiff-Appellant, 
I vs . 
\ SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, Utah 
! State Prison, 
' Defendant-Respondent. J 
I 
Case No. 
13666 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
m APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JAMES S. 
SAWAYA, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
INEY VERNON B. ROMI 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS f 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
LARRY R. KELLER l l j r f 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ^ **"" ™ 
343 South Sixth East ,)£ 13 74 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 § 
Attorney for Appellant Gbi' ^P™>™ ''^* Utah 
LORRAINE P R E S S 1397 SOUTH MAIN STREET SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH PHOMF 4 a ? . n « « . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS AN 
INAPPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR APPEAL 
BECAUSE FINAL J U D G M E N T WAS 
NEVER ENTERED ON THAT ISSUE BY 
THE LOWER COURT 2 
POINT II. APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS 
KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY 
MADE 4 
CONCLUSION 10 
CASES CITED 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 
L. Ed. 2d 74 (1969) 5 
Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970) 6 
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 
(1968) 4 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 7441, 
35 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970) 6 
Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 468 P. 2d 369 
(1970) 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
Meisbauer v. Rhay, 79 Wash. 2d 505, 487 P. 2d 1046 
(1971) 8 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) 9 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 
27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970) 6 
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 90 S. Ct. 
1474, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970) 6 
People v. Marsh, Colo., 516 P. 2d 431 (1973) 8 
People v. Jaworski, 25 Mich. App. 540, 181 N. W. 2d 
811 (1970) 8 
Raisley v. Sullivan, Or. App., 493 P. 2d 745 (1972) .. 9 
State v. Pichard, 109 Ariz. 65, 505 P. 2d 236 (1973).. 8,9 
State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 424, 183 N. W. 2d 763 
(1971) 7 
United States v. Frontero, 452 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 
1971) 7 
United States v. Webb, 433 F. 2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970) 6 
Wade v. Coiner, 468 F. 2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1971) 7 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B(i) ... 3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS KNUDSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent J 
Case No. 
13666 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Douglas Knudsen, a/k/a Douglas 
Knuteson, appeals from a judgment of the Third District 
Court denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Douglas Knudsen, petitioned the 
Third District Court for a writ of habeas corpus for re-
lease from incarceration in the Utah State Prison. The 
petition was denied after a hearing conducted before the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya on March 21, 1974. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
Third District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as stated by the appellant 
is acceptable. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS AN INAP-
PROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR APPEAL BE-
CAUSE FINAL JUDGMENT WAS NEVER 
E N T E R E D ON THAT ISSUE BY THE 
LOWER COURT. 
Appellant argues that his plea of guilty to the crime 
of burglary was not knowingly and intelligently made 
because the trial judge did not specifically mention the 
constitutional rights that are waived through a guilty 
plea. This issue was not raised or decided in the hearing 
on habeas corpus before the Third District Court. Ap-
pellant's complaint raised the issue that the guilty plea 
was not intelligently entered because he did not under-
stand the nature of the crime being charged. At no time 
was the argument advanced regarding failure to mention 
constitutional rights that are waived by a guilty plea. 
Therefore, a new issue has been raised on this appeal 
which was not raised in the court below. The Third Dis-
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trict Court, under Judge James S. S&waya, decided that 
the plea was intelligently made because appellant knew 
the nature of the offense charged. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B(i), which 
governs the bringing of habeas corpus petitions, provides: 
"(10) Any final judgment entered upon 
such complaint may be appealed to and reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in 
civil cases." 
Since the habeas corpus complaint in the present case 
did not raise the issue which is presently raised on this 
appeal, and since no final judgment was made on that 
issue, an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court is inapprop-
riate. 
Rule 65B (i) provides an orderly procedure for bring-
ing habeas corpus actions. The complaint (petition) 
should set forth each and every claim of violation of 
constitutional rights. If this is done, all issues can be 
tested in a hearing before any appeal is taken. The lower 
court should have the first opportunity to correct con-
stitutional wrongs. When a habeas corpus issue is raised 
for the first time before the Utah Supreme Court on 
appeal, the orderly procedure of presentation in a hearing 
has been bypassed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously refused to 
consider an issue which was raised on habeas corpus 
appeal for the first time. In Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 
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2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1968), the Fourth District Court 
entered an order denying a petition for habeas corpus, 
and an appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court refused to hear a newly raised issue by saying: 
"Appellant contends in his brief that the 
failure to appeal the Third District Court's judg-
ment was due to the failure of counsel, appointed 
by this court, to prosecute the appeal. This 
matter was not presented in the pleadings or 
the hearing before the Fourth District Court. 
It is raised for the first time upon this appeal. 
Habeas corpus being a civil remedy it is not 
necessary for this court to consider this point." 
Id. at 120. 
Since the appellant in our case did not present the 
matter of waiver of constitutional rights at the hearing, 
he should be prevented from raising the issue on appeal. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOW-
INGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE. 
In Utah, there is a presumption that a plea of guilty 
is knowingly and intelligently made. A defendant who 
attacks this presumption must overcome it by showing 
clearly that he was prejudiced to the extent that he was 
denied his cxoistitutional rights. Mayne v. Turner, 24 
Utah 2d 195, 468 P. 2d 369 (1970). Respondent respect-
fully submits that appellant has failed to meet this bur-
den. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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An examination of the proceedings which resulted 
in appellant's incarceration reveals that appellant intelli-
gently and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. Spedf-
ically, he was asked if he understood: 
(1) That the crime would not have to be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt by his pleading guilty; 
(2) That a guilty plea would have the same effect 
as a jury or court conviction of the crime; 
(3) The possible sentence to be imposed (T. 3). 
In addition, appellant was asked if he had been 
promised anything or threatened with any consequences 
if he did not plead guilty. He answered that he had not. 
In fact, appellant indicated that his reason for pleading 
guilty was because he was guilty (T. 4). 
The appellant indicated that the decision was his 
own (T. 4). 
Respondent respectfully submits that the above facts 
show that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof. 
The very evidence introduced by him in the lower court 
shows that his guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly 
entered. 
Appellant argues that a guilty plea is knowingly 
enteral only when three constitutional guarantees are 
specifically waived. He bases this assertion on his narrow 
reading of certain dictum found in the case of Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 74 
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(1969). The holding of the Court in the case was that 
the trial record must reflect that the accused voluntarily 
and intelligently entered a plea of guilty. In that case, 
the record was completely silent as to the nature of the 
accused's guilty plea. In our case, the record is ex-
tensive on the intelligence and voluntariness of appel-
lant's plea of guilty. 
In a later case, Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 
742, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). Justice 
White, writing for the majority of the Court restated 
the holding in Boykin saying: 
"The requirement that a plea of guilty must 
be intelligent and voluntary to be valid has long 
been recognized (Citation omitted). The new 
element added in Boykin was the requirement 
that the record must affirmatively disclose that 
the defendant who plead guilty entered his plea 
understandingly and voluntarily." Ibid, footnote 
4, page 747. 
None of the United States Supreme Court cases 
after Boykin have required a judge to get a specific 
waiver of the rights suggested by appellant. See Brady 
v. United States, supra; McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U. S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 
790 (1970); and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 
(1970). 
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 
held in United States v. Webb, 433 F. 2d 400 (1st Cir. 
1970), that the specific waiver of certain constitutional 
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rights was an unnecessary element of a valid guilty plea. 
In that case, after discussion with counsel, the defen-
dant pled guilty to violating the Dyer Act. He later con-
tended that the court failed to inform him that by plead-
ing guilty, he was waiving certain constitutional rights. 
The court reasoned that it was self-evident that these 
rights were being waived, and that it would not add to 
defendant's understanding to "require the court to recite 
a ritualistic list of constitutional rights that are obviously 
being waived." Id. at 403. 
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 
also has held that it is not necessary for the trial court 
to specifically mention the constitutional rights which 
are waived by a guilty plea. Their reasoning was that 
a catechism of constitutional rights that are waived is 
not compelled by the Constitution and is without prece-
dent from the Supreme Court or elsewhere. Wade v. 
Coiner, 468 F. 2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1971); United States 
v. Frontero, 452 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971). 
Numerous state courts also do not require that con-
stitutional rights be specifically defined and waived. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Turner, 186 Neb. 
424 425, 183 N. W. 2d 763, 765 (1971), held that the 
judge in a trial court does not have to tell the defendant 
every constitutional right, and obtain an expressed waiver 
of each before the plea can be said to be intelligently 
made. The court was of the opinion that an item-by-item 
review of constitutional rights waived when a guilty plea 
is entered is too extreme a wnstmctioin of Boykin, and 
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that the essential point is whether the accused under-
stands the relevant factors involved in a guilty plea. The 
Washington Supreme Court similarly held that the mere 
fact that the trial court failed to advise the respondent, 
before accepting his plea of guilty, that he thereby for-
feited rights incident to trial and failed to further advise 
him of the maximum sentence which the court could 
impose upon him, did not render the respondent's guilty 
plea void on the ground that it was not intelligently 
made. Meisbauer v. Rhay, 79 Wash. 2d 505, 487 P. 2d 
1046 (1971). Finally, in People v. Jaworski, 25 Mich. 
App. 540, 181 N. W. 2d 811 (1970), the Michigan Court 
of Appeals refused to interpret Boykin as requiring the 
trial court to specifically inform a defendant represented 
by counsel of certain constitutional rights waived by 
entering a guilty plea. The court reasoned that intelli-
gence and voluntariness have nothing to do with waiver 
of the constitutional rights as mentioned in Boykin, and 
that intelligence means only that the accused has suffi-
cient knowledge of the relevant circumstances and like 
consequences. Id. at 554, 817-818. 
In People v. Marsh, Colo., 516 P. 2d 431 (1973), the 
defendant's guilty plea was acceptable even though he 
had not been specifically informed that the plea of guilty 
waived his right to confront accusers and to remain silent 
during trial. The reasoning for this decision was that 
the Supreme Court in Boykin did not intend to put such 
"straight jacket formalism upon the process of receiving 
guilty pleas in state prosecution." State v. Pichard, 109 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
Ariz. 65, 505 P. 2d 236 (1973), held that where there is 
other ample basis to support the plea, the trial judge 
need not inform the defendant at the time of his plea 
of the right to confront witnesses and the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Therefore, case authority does not 
support appellant's contention that certain constitutional 
rights must be specifically explained and waived before 
a plea of guilty can be intelligently entered. 
To prevent the possibility of confessed criminals 
using procedural loopholes to flood the courts with post-
conviction proceedings, appellate courts have long strived 
to avoid imposing excessively formalistic procedural re-
quirements upon judges in the lower courts. For ex-
ample: The United States Supreme Court in Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), qualified its ruling 
by providing that warnings of rights were not constitu-
tionally required if an adequate substitute could be 
found. Id. at 467. This same policy has been applied 
to guilty plea cases. The Oregon Court of Appeals held 
on February 10, 1972, that they will not impose a rigid 
formula on lower state courts in their determination of 
the validity of guilty pleas; rather a judge who accepts 
a guilty plea must have sufficient latitude to tailor his 
questions to the needs of the defendant before him. 
Raisley v. Sullivan, Or. App., 493 P. 2d 745, 747 (1972). 
The transcript of the criminal proceedings which 
are the subject of this appeal clearly show that appellant 
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. The constitu-
tionality of the guilty plea has therefore been established. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to show that his guilty plea 
was other than knowingly and intelligently entered. 
Furthermore, he has raised an issue on appeal that was 
not a subject of the hearing appealed from. For these 
reasons the respondent respectfully requests this Coxirt 
to affirm the lower court's ruling denying petitioner's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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